Sunday Supplement 17 Aug 25 - The QT Vanity Bonfire

“Journalism is printing what someone else does not want printed; everything else is public relations.” - George Orwell, visionary and author This week’s quote again looks forward to the deep dive - I felt the blood pressure rising as I even considered writing and talking about this topic, but we need to face the truth about just how much taxpayer money the Bank of England has actively wasted and is wasting with poor strategy around Quantitative Tightening. Before we go into this week full hammer - Rod Turner and I will be running our next Property Business workshop on Wednesday 1st October, in London - subject matter this time is Investment, with an emphasis on what metrics you really need to be considering to run your property business properly, and building your business to scale. We’re digging into the real fundamentals of property investment for growth—from proper valuation and strategic debt structuring to the investment metrics serious pros use (hint: ditch ROI and yield). Learn why some deals work for some and not others, how to manage risk as your portfolio scales, and when to shift gear from side hustle to scalable business. We’ll break bottlenecks, build strategic pillars, and unpack real-life case studies of fast company growth. How have we done so many deals? We’ll tell you! Book the SUPER EARLY BIRD tickets with 20%+ off, now: http://bit.ly/pbweight Kicking off, then, as has become customary - Trumpwatch. I wonder if this section will persist “thru” 2028 as the Americans would say - I suspect it will. A second 90-day extension was signed for China with hours to go until the deadline - the new date for the diary is November 10th. It is hard to see this as anything but “advantage China”, you would think - he really doesn’t want to bring what he’s threatened into play, is how I would read it, but we will see, won’t we!? On the river, to preserve the bluff and so as to not look too weak, the mention was of semiconductor tariffs coming “soon”, hinting at some triple-digit level tariffs - one area that makes an element of sense since the US has poured a lot of time and effort into making semiconductors inside the US, so this could be one of the areas which is easier to measure the impact of than many of the others, which have been a little opaque (but have started, you would think, to filter through to inflation - otherwise you are having to ignore some significant circumstantial evidence, let’s say). The lucky chair of the Federal Reserve was threatened with the lesser spotted Trump lawsuit, a favourite tool over the years. After inflation held at 2.7% (CPI) even though expectations were to rise one tick, the core inflation rate hit 3.1% (2.9% the month before), when expectations were 3%. A small nuance - and indeed, the markets saw an increased probability of a 50 bps cut in the US base rate for September - but the core is usually the one to watch for what’s really going on, and what’s really going on is the 3% world, not the 2% one. It’s only been 6 months since core CPI in the US was this high, and between June 2024 and February 2025 it printed between 3.1% and 3.3% - but the graph is taking an uptick. I just get the feeling that if you asked Mr Trump he would just shrug his shoulders and say “so what” - and whilst 3% inflation is not the end of the world, the “so what” is that you have your largest independent quasi-governmental organisation targeting 2% inflation. Now - he’s addressed this in a way (or perhaps Bessent has, as his proxy). There’s talk as flagged over recent weeks of moving away from inflation targeting. I can’t tell you just how much I think this would impact bond markets negatively - as soon as you put inflation as your second priority, fixed income investors are bound to be concerned about how high it might go. It seems an inescapable trap to me (without a restructure during a crisis of course, but writedowns on US bonds would truly question the current global financial world order). Personally I wouldn’t think, all else being equal with an independent central bank, that it looks like a cutting cycle (and I shared similar evidence-based posts this week on my LinkedIn) - but the political pressure and messaging is clear, so I’m sure cuts are in the mixer next up for US bonds (and the UK will not be complaining, it is helpful to our cost of debt too). We will see! Over to our specialist subject on this side of the pond - the real time UK property market. Chris Watkin delivers - Week 31 has been reported on. Listings printed 32.7k, another tick down as the school holidays continue around the country as far as the figures go, and are now only 3.7% higher than 2024 YTD and 7% higher than the pre-pandemic market. My “10% more stock than a normal market” ready reckoner is still working on the back of circa 2 years of overperformance in listings compared to historical averages. We are 12.1% ahead of the 9 year average, but that does include 2020 which pollutes the figures somewhat. We are really coming back to the 2024 numbers now, having been 6-7% above them at various points in the year - but we are still listing more than we are selling, so it is all eyes on the withdrawal rate as a general rule. “Only” 21,800 price reductions in week 31, 14.1% being July’s official number, with 14% reduced in June, compared to last year’s 12.1%, May’s 13.4%, and the 5-year average of 10.6%. More stock, more reductions - absolutely and relatively. 33% more reductions than the 5 year average, if you take the difference between 14.1% and 10.6%. “25% more reduced properties than a normal market” also works as a ready reckoner. One in seven properties on the market are being reduced each month (so we are currently running at perhaps 90 to 95 thousand price reductions per month, to be clear!). Can’t find a deal? Just keep the legwork up and you’ll get there. You don’t tend to see 14%+ of stock being reduced in strong markets, by any stretch. Sideways pricing continues……. 25k homes sold subject to contract, for a quieter week but the 2025 average is 26,500. Healthy is still the best description. SSTCs are up 7.1% year on year and 14.3% on 2017-19, and still nearly keeping pace with 2022 (which to this point was a very hot market indeed). With SSTCs up 7.1%, whereas listings now are only up 3.7% on last year, this signifies more transactions than 12 months ago, to this point in the year, for sure - or, put a different way, comparatively this looks like a more functional year than 2024 was. We went into August with 763,178 homes on the market - around 5k up on July’s number. For context, as the market got stickier before the pandemic that number was c. 660k, a sellers’ market is more likely to be under 600k. At the end of July 2024, 716k were on the market. These are more “higher high” numbers and so the “flat” feeling as I’ve been saying for some time now will likely continue to manifest itself in a steady market without much excitement as we get through the school holidays. It’s the second month in a row of not moving too far forward though - less than 1% more homes on the market compared to the month before - it feels like we are nearing or are already at the peak? We can’t read too much into August’s activity anyway but there’s always an extra surge in September when the school holidays are over, alongside a clearout of “no-hoper” stock where vendors mostly can’t take the medicine that the corporate agents are trying to prescribe for them - so we likely need to see those figures before drawing conclusions, as they could be somewhat different this year with just so much stock out there. Chris also looks at the per square foot on sold STC properties - it has a very strong correlation with prices that hit the land reg in 5 months’ time. This time round - July was at £344.78/sqft and that was 1.97% higher than July 2024 and 3.85% higher than July 2022. It was down around half a percent on June’s SSTC number of £346.45, I think we are holding on to about a 2% - 2.5% up market for 2025, a little under my prediction (3.75%) and also below inflation, wage rises and the likes. At the risk of the broken record - sideways, sideways, sideways. Fall throughs nudged back below the long-term average of 24.2%, printing 23.6% - relatively normal “noise”, there’s been very little volatility around the long-term average for many weeks now. The net sales are still there or thereabouts - 19k, 5.8% up on last year and 10.6% higher than 2017-19 - not quite at 2022 levels but let’s see where we get to by the end of the year - I think it will be a close run thing on transaction volume compared to 2022 in a much less volatile year. I always give Chris a weekly shout out here because he’s more prolific than “just” this epic tome he releases weekly on the UK property market - he comes up with some great stats on a regular basis. Drop him a like, subscribe, and all the rest of it and some kind words for his content creation. If you are in the industry and want support in growing your business or to be a more effective communicator/be more in touch with your local market - that’s his core business - give him a shout. The article gets published on the Property Industry Eye website, and the video on his YouTube channel - @christopherwatkin

Time to surf the Macrowaves once more. A big week. The first two pick themselves. Unemployment and the labour market - a must read. GDP growth - and, in spite of overall scorn being poured (by the likes of me, aside from anyone else), there was some, after a very strong June has hit the books. The RICS house price balance for July has to take the third slot, as the surveyor’s take on this sideways but functional market has given us plenty to think about over recent months. At the back end - yep, gilts and swaps, but you knew that, right?

The labour market then. The headline number - held, for the first time since February, rather than ticking upwards. 4.7%, if you are keeping score. There’s ongoing shade about the accuracy of the ONS jobs data, and the ONS send us a reminder in the report that this is still a work in progress (a lot of this is done via survey, the labour force survey - and therefore there can be inaccuracies and sampling errors, as you might imagine). The news really isn’t as negative as the headline rate, however - mostly because economic inactivity was just so high after the pandemic. Genuine illness, burnout, “the great resignation”, a whole host of other reasons that you could provide - but those economically active are down. This is a positive, and the inevitable result of this is that unemployment would rise. However - I’d feel a lot more comfortable about this if the rate of vacancies wasn’t dropping like a stone, and if there was workable communication from the ruling party about job creation - which, aside from public sector jobs, has been sparse to say the least. I don’t see a “job creation” plan or strategy in place. The numbers as they shake down then: 75.3% employed, 4.7% unemployed, 21% inactive (unemployment is 16+, rather than 16-64 as the other metrics are, because if someone 65+ is seeking a job they are registered as unemployed). Given that those three numbers add up to 101% (they usually do) it tells you just how many 65+ people are registered as unemployed! I have no idea why they don’t make it 16-66 for all 3 metrics, and introduce some consistency. Talking of vacancies falling like a stone, though, the number now is 718,000. The last time - if we skip the Covid blip in vacancies - that there were this few job vacancies in the UK was the quarter ending January 2015 - so just over 10 and a half years ago. The surveys are pretty clear - firms are not necessarily recruiting new workers, or replacing workers that have left. Public sector earnings have really started to pull away from private sector numbers - public sector printing 5.7% and private sector 4.8%. The headline number, which is often quoted as the earnings including bonus, was actually down a decent chunk from 5% to 4.6%, but if you look at excluding bonus, which I prefer because it should reduce volatility aside from anything else, the number stayed stable at 5%. The headlines were positive enough (and the Bank of England really wants to see this number under 4%), but I’m not sure we really had too much progress there. The public sector has long lagged the private sector, and much of this could be badged as “catchup”, but nevertheless, where parts of the public sector continue to pay unsustainable final salary style pensions, it is never going to be heralded as good news. There’s always a technical discussion over which measure of unemployment to trust, but it is relatively easy to see that the payrolled employees - which you’d think would be the most reliable of all, since HMRC has real-time payroll information from employers - has fallen in 10 of the last 12 months. Of course, it can be more people choosing (or being forced, with national insurance rises) to go self-employed, but a fall in 10 of the last 12 months is a clear pattern (and is pretty much a summary of the Government’s current record in charge as far as unemployment goes). Real earnings, after CPIH (which the ONS prefers as a measure of inflation, inflation including housing costs) are up less than 1% - although better compared, probably, to GDP growth (1.2% at this time), and CPI, because GDP is adjusted for CPI. Those numbers are more like 1.5%, so there is not a huge difference - in plain English, wages are growing ever so slightly faster than the overall economy, but not much. To take the most positive part of the entire piece - the inactivity rate is down from Q1’s 21.4% to 21.0%. Good progress. This doesn’t look like vast decreases in NHS waiting lists (although the direction of travel has been positive, and overall, news is good on that front, we aren’t making incredible progress that would bring that many people back into work). The lack of vacancies can’t be anything other than concerning though. When and where will this fall in numbers stop? The pace of the drop increasing - which, again, has to be linked with the circumstantial evidence of making employing people much more expensive - is the concern, and it has to be this week’s image. Growth, then. There is some. That’s the end of that. Jokes aside, what I’ve been clear on in the wake of the budget is that growth from the private sector perspective would be restricted by the moves that Rachel Reeves had made. However, I have also stated a number of times that there is the potential for growth from the public spending perspective - and also that this would be much more difficult to forecast (and there are, as usual, a number of ways of measuring it which simply serves to obfuscate things yet further). We know we had decent PMIs for June, although they were almost a one-off and have receded back in July, so we were expecting an OK month. The economic consensus was a 0.1% quarter. I thought 0% would be closer to the truth, especially as we had to absorb “Awful April”. My LinkedIn commentary was simple - I was delighted to be wrong. The print? 0.3% for the quarter, 1.2% for the year-on-year, and a 0.4% print for June. Lest we forget, the first quarter printed 0.7%, so things look great, right? Well, not so much on the employment front (as discussed), but up has to be better than down. The “one-off” for the tariffs has not been a one-off. I would be absolutely amazed if we kept this pace going (that’s 1% for H1 2025, which is a mile away from where I thought it would be) - imagine if we did print 2% growth this year - whilst it sounds low, it is post-inflation and it would be a magnificent result. My feeling is still that that absolutely won’t happen, but my forecasts in some of these months are just turning out to be too bearish. Into the report for a bit more detail, then. GDP per head was up 0.2% in the quarter, and 0.7% on the year. How did we get here, when April was down 0.3%? Ah - the magic dust, of course. April’s figure has now been revised to a fall of 0.1%, rather than 0.3%. This starts to explain something (although 0.2% doesn’t equal 0.3%, of course - although it sometimes does at the ONS). Services - as so often - did the bulk of the legwork here. They were up 0.4% for Q2, after growth of 0.7% in Q1. The largest contributor was information and communication, and delving a little deeper, specifically computer programming, consultancy and related activities. AI-based, you have to wonder? Construction had a good quarter (remember, the most recent flash PMI is for Q3, not Q2) and expanded 1.2% for the quarter (a massive figure) - both new work, and maintenance and repair, expanding by a similar amount. Then we get to a meaty bit. A classic “ONS quote” where you need to read a little more. “Growth in the latest quarter was mainly driven by Government consumption and “gross capital formation: other”” That’s as clear as mud, then. What does that mean? Change in inventories and acquisitions less disposal of valuables - stocking up, perhaps because of tariffs, perhaps because of fresh budgets for the 2025-26 fiscal year. Summed to 0.2% of GDP. That’s a chunky spend. Then, another cracking quote. “Growth in nominal GDP was mainly driven by increases in compensation of employees in Quarter 2 2025”. We are mainly growing because we are paying people more. See any problems here? Either way, where does it leave us, internationally? Behind the US, who grew 0.7% in Q2 2025 (but shrank 0.1% in Q1) - level with France, and ahead of the rest of the G7 who printed figures that were either flat or slightly backwards. On the face of it, things look fine and a dyed-in-the-wool Labour supporter could critique my growth forecasting for 2025 so far as politically motivated; however, I come out as “annoyingly” central on a political compass questionnaire, and have more of a tilt towards market-based solutions than state-based solutions, but this is an evidence-based position rather than a politically motivated one (and that normally dictates the “north and south” of a political compass test, authoritarian regimes versus libertarian ones). Overall, great news at the top level, but below the surface, not a lot bears scrutiny - we know we are spending above what we can afford, the OBR have told us we can’t go on like this, but at the moment….we are, so enjoy it while it lasts, especially if you work for the public sector! Onto the RICS residential market survey. “Sales market conditions remain challenging with previous signs of recovery faltering somewhat”. A long-winded way of saying what I’ve been saying for some time - things are a bit sideways at the moment. Now - you’d expect the mortgage approval data, and the banks, to be a little ahead of the surveyors, although the surveyors are of course providing the bank valuations. Anecdotally, on the ground, we are being encouraged to list any properties we have for sale with a “realistic” mindset - which is rare, but is symptomatic of this market. We always do anyway - not that our choice of agent is necessarily bound to know this. The numbers in the survey are one side or the other of even stevens, apart from; sales agreed -16% compared to June printing -4%, weaker prices overall but driven by the South, as has been the case since interest rates started to normalise, and tenant demand eased as much as it has done for a long time - although the landlord instructions print of -31% is the weakest figure in the survey since April 2020. The Telegraph jumped on this sole point accordingly and blamed anyone who would listen - the figure is important, but it is just one month - if, instead as is being anecdotally reported, there are enough buyers out there, but they are volume buyers who do not use external letting agents, the survey is not a good measure of the change in the shape of the market. Gilts and swaps, then, for the week. As per last week, without too much UK news to drive rates (unemployment didn’t change anything, growth means rate cuts become yet less likely, and the momentum at the end of last week after the Bank of England meeting was drifting yields, as reported) - We opened the week at 4.007% and closed at 4.093%. A drift of 8.7 basis points. Thursday’s swap close of 3.707% was higher than a month and a year ago, but only just; Thursday’s gilt close of 4.061% means the 35-36 basis point discount is still being preserved. Things look pretty stable in that camp. How about the longs, then? The 30 year also had an up-week, opening at 5.395% and closing at a whopping 5.568% yield. That 17 basis point drift is basically double the drift in the 5-year, and thus the yield curve gets ever steeper still. We aren’t far away from no pension funds doing anything other than buying gilts, with some inflation hedges, in my view! After 6 years (don’t ask me why it is 6!) the yield curve just goes up like an escalator, from the current gilt low (which is 3 years from now, at just under 3.75%) up, up and away up to this peak at 30 years out of over 5.5% per year. One year ago the 30s were trading at 4.473% yield, not bad at all of course - how high can we go? This leads me to a soapbox subject that I’ve discussed before, but it is that time of year. The annual review of quantitative tightening for the Bank of England. Buckle up, because it gets technical, but it is incredibly important and significant in terms of where the taxpayer gets, frankly, the rough end of the stick. The eyes always water in these situations (which is why we need the deep dive scuba mask on) - but as always, I will attempt to translate a complex issue into as much plain English as possible. What I’m struggling to process more is that it is almost a year since I wrote about this issue in some detail! The issue at hand: Using the money printer to get ourselves out of “trouble”. What qualifies as trouble? Well, in the past 15+ years or so, the Global Financial Crisis, Brexit, and also Covid. In 4 chunks we issued nearly a trillion pounds worth of bonds, and bought them at the Bank of England, with (in theory) the Treasury’s money. In the real world, this money made its way out there into the financial sector (and in the case of Covid, beyond that). In Covid you’ll remember it effectively as bounceback loans, grants, and the likes - much more like “helicopter money” - not as plain as the cheques issued with Donald Trump’s name on them in the US, but a similar impact across a less broad base of people (rather than everyone with a social security number). Why was it needed according to economic theory? Because the interest rate couldn’t really go down any further. Sure, it could have gone negative, but the schools of thought around negative interest rates were not congruent, or clear. There’s much more evidence around now because half a dozen or so central banks did go for it, but at the time decisions needed to be made - not so much. Real time experiments with entire economies are understandably undesirable! What now? Well, rates have gone back up and we haven’t had a complete disaster. Indeed, the housing market has largely absorbed this normalisation without too much fuss, mostly allowing 2023’s rampant inflation to change prices in real terms without an overadjustment in nominal prices. Real prices are - as I’ve said a number of times recently - lower than they have been for over 20 years if you consider wages, and the lowest for 12+ years if you only consider RPI inflation and don’t worry about wages. Before you shake yourself, on average wages the income tax landscape is also more favourable than it has been over all of that time frame (other tax landscapes are not - granted - but income tax has been looked after over decades, mostly as a votewinner). When rates went back up, the purist economists at the Bank of England looked and thought“oh well, we don’t need that £900bn+ of bonds any more. Time to get rid of them.” I smell an issue here - but to be plain about it, the problem is that they are not tasked with getting value for money for the taxpayer. With this in mind, they voted to embark upon a programme of quantitative tightening which involved two things - firstly, letting bonds mature on their own. The money would be “retired” - burnt is a better analogy if you like the money printing analogy, even though it is all electronic these days - and this would lead to no profit, no loss. The Treasury paid the interest to the Bank of England, in terms of the coupons on those bonds - and then the money, which never existed in the first place, zooms out of existence. This isn’t perfect, but it does almost sound too good to be true, doesn’t it? Money when we needed it. We know now that that money went mostly into inflating asset prices, rather than really helping the economy at the grass roots level; but nevertheless, it feels like the perfect crime. However - what if the models and the textbooks tell you that’s not fast enough? Well, that’s what has happened here, so the Bank got actively involved in selling bonds into the open market. Here’s where the problem started. The problem, if you like, can be addressed at the accounting level. If you “mark-to-market” - work out your P&L in real time - then the Bank had lost a lot of money. Think about it this way. A bond redeems at £1000 face value. The Bank “bought” them at £990, say. The Bank then actively looks to sell them at £950, to a real person (more likely an institution) in the secondary market. Loss? £40 per £1000 bought, or 4%. The numbers are proxies, but not out of kilter with reality (remember when yields go up dramatically, as they have done, that is the same thing as saying that the price of the actual bonds has gone down). No-one kicked in here and said - hold on, what if we just let them ALL expire organically? Then we don’t book this loss? That is not part of the Bank’s remit, as I said, nor did the chancellors of the time (last time out) make any comments, nor has Rachel Reeves. We are talking to the tune of tens of billions here. Real money in this smoke and mirrors game of creating and destroying it at the Central Bank level. Taxpayer’s money, one way or another. Then, there was another problem, if you can believe it. If you sell hundreds of billions of bonds, actively, into a market that is of a certain size, and is well established, this provides extra supply without necessarily creating extra demand. Then when you come to sell the bonds you would normally sell, as you are rotating your debt, the only thing that has to give is the price. More supply, lower price - lower price of bonds, higher cost of debt. The Bank recognised this, and - as they often do, marked their own homework. 0.1% to 0.15% is “all” it would cost us, they said, in terms of yields. Still yield that we can ill afford, as a collection of households, or as a nation. 0.1% to 0.15% in the wrong direction, with no real argument as to why we couldn’t just wait for the bonds to expire. The plot thickens. The FT this week published a piece on the fiscal consequences of this monetary policy. In a roundabout way - a QE black hole, created by QT. Or - “you’ve gotta pay someday”. Sure - but why pick the shorter term? There is a paper published from last year, which does a robust job of aggregating monetary policy outcomes from around the world (as the Bank of England, as you might know, was by no means the only one using QE post-2008). There is, in this paper, a more robust method of measuring the impact of QT. 7 central banks are compared. The outcome - guess what? Actually up to 0.7% was found to be the impact on the yields. Now we are starting to talk about really significant numbers. Basically three-quarters of a percent. The difference from the Bank’s own numbers (to cost about £16 billion over three years - still wholeheartedly unnecessary, I would argue, and simply because of not giving the Bank the correct remit) to these numbers - £60bn of cost in perhaps one year - is huge. As it goes, the analysis shows that the longer the duration of the bonds involved, the more impact it had on the yield of those bonds - so, in the case of the strangely expensive 30-year bonds at this time, this could well be one of the major drivers of that very steep yield curve. This is utterly unacceptable. If people truly understood this, this would be the reason for protesting on the streets. Treble the theoretical raise from the employer’s national insurance rise in April this year - and about 6 to 8 times what it truly raised, when the dust settles (although I am talking about one-off money, not an annual cost, to be clear). I think instead we should have been asking for more. Why are we not using this opportunity to get rates DOWN, rather than up? Well, that would mean creating more demand than we are supplying, using the same classic economic logic. How? Well, instead of selling ANY bonds, what about if we BOUGHT some longer dated bonds to replace some of the expiring debt, at a rate that worked - perhaps replacing the expiring bonds with 20%, or 30%, of their face value in terms of longer-dated nominal bonds, or even better, index-linked bonds to reduce the Government’s own exposure to inflation, which it cannot control (by design!). What’s at the centre of my logic? Well, the fact that this recent run of events is historically notable. A financial crisis noted as a one-in-75 year event. A pandemic, accepted as a one-in-100 year event. How can we be expected to get over those in such short time frames? It would be much more appropriate to describe an initial response, which was significant in both cases, and then a repair period that was in the decades, which allowed for similar “cautious repair” by the Central Bank as well as the Government. Whilst I appreciate the comments I attract on a regular basis for my analysis, and I have two masters degrees with a healthy dose of Economics in them, I cannot give you an argument for “getting on with it” such as the Bank of England have done. I have asked the question to the regional rep, and never had a really robust answer. It is all a very public sector approach to the whole problem, is how I’ve seen it, I’m afraid. The Bank did, last week, suggest that their 10-15 basis point “output” should actually be closer to 15-25 basis points, as they get to their annual vote on HOW to keep enacting QT. The frustrating thing here as well - the damage is done. The closest proxy, in many ways, is the Gordon Brown gold sell-off - wait until a period of historical lows in the prices (highs in this case, because we are selling to crystallise a paper loss, that just doesn’t need crystallising), and then sell it - the worst possible timing. Buy high, sell low - that’s exactly what we did, and we all know that’s not smart. The summary of the FT piece this week - the policy review for September is under pressure to slow or reshape QT - ideally in the way that I’ve said, but I don’t see it happening - but it will be quiet, niche, and barely understood - a total disgrace in my book. I hope that I’ve done something here to help you understand the situation - one of the great financial scandals of modern times, I don’t think I’m being overdramatic by describing it as that. Before I do close, don’t forget to book your SUPER EARLY BIRD tickets to the next Property Business Workshop that Rod and I are running on Wednesday 1st October in central London. This time around - investment metrics and how to run your property business at scale. My favourite topic of all! Book here: http://bit.ly/pbweight Above all - please remember to Keep Calm, ALWAYS listen to or read the Supplement, and Carry On; there will be opportunities abound this year and towards 2030 and beyond - the landscape has been set for a surefire bull run. It will be slow(ish), and take a little while longer to get off the ground - and the amount of stock around is still keeping things suppressed at the moment - but as yields currently continue to improve, it is a case of “here we go” in my opinion.

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Sunday Supplement 17 Aug 25 - The QT Vanity Bonfire

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